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dI  POLICY  RESEARCH WORKING  PAPER 1481
Summary  findings
Dittus and Prowse review corporate governance  countries. This reflects limited understanding of the
arrangements in the West and conclude that for a system  financial sector's poor condition, the many institutional
based on bank ownership and control of firms to  and political obstacles to bank reform, and the initial
succeed, the banking system must be free of perverse  decision in many countries to focus first on the "real
incentives and state interference, as well as subject to  economy" (a decision that in hindsight seems
adequate supervision by banking authorities and  unfortunate).
competition from market forces. Admirable progress  *  Dispel the belief (which still exists in some
over the past few years notwithstanding, these conditions  countries) that poor lending and investments will
do not now exist in the countries of Central Europe and  eventually be underwritten by the government, with few
Russia, so a corporate governance system based on bank  consequences for managers.
ownership is not appropriate.  That is not to say that such  Greatly strengthen competition in the banking
a system would not eventually be appropriate  - but not  system, in part by encouraging new private banks and the
before much more effort is made to create a competitive,  entry of foreign banks. (Some countries, such as Poland,
private, well-supervised banking system (which is needed  have taken the opposite tack, refusing to issue new
in any case).  licenses.)
Changes in the banking system that are prerequisites  - Provide effective bank supervision and an effective
for any large-scale bank involvement in the ownership  prudential and regulatory framework. This requires
and governance of firms are simple to enunciate but less  investing substantially in setting up institutions,
easy to implement:  accounting systems, and information networks, in hiring
*  Sever existing relationships between the state and  and training qualified personnel, and in ensuring that the
banks. Privatization is the strongest giuarantee  that bank  system is immune from political intervention.
investment decisions will not be subject to state  Developing such a system will surely be long and drawn
influence, but bank privatization has been slow in most  out, and may require foreign assistance.
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Five years after the start of economic reforms in central and eastern Europe, the issue of
corporate governance remains  largely unresolved.  While  privatisation, foreign  direct  investment,
increasingly competitive markets and the introduction of hard budget constraints have enforced some
discipline on managers and encouraged rationalisation and downsizing in firms, there is undeniably a
great need for a strong mechanism of corporate governance in these countries which can effectively
replace managers where appropriate and actively restructure firms. Some observers have argued that
banks should fill the vacuum by swapping debt for equity, or purchasing equity outright, and taking
an  active  role  in  the  restructuring and  governance of  nonfinancial enterprises. They  base  their
recommendation on the experience of countries like Japan and Germany where banks have played an
important role in  corporate governance.1 Do  these countries provide an appropriate role model?
Should banks in central Europe and Russia own shares and become involved in the governance of
nonfinancial firms? These are the questions we attempt to answer in this paper. We do so by analysing
the corporate governance systems in different western countries and attempting to derive lessons for
the countries in central Europe, recognising the existing conditions in these transition countries with
regard to their capital markets and banking systems.
Doubtless banks are already playing a major role in corporate governance in central Europe
and Russia, and  will continue to  do  so. The reason is simply  that they  hold the  lion's share of
enterprise debt, most of it being of short maturity. The possibility to refuse to roll over credit gives
bank a potentially powerful control instrument over enterprises. A companion paper by Baer and Gray
(1994) deals with this aspect of corporate control by banks. Our focus is narrower. We ask whether
banks can and should play a role in corporate governance based on ownership rights.
To anticipate the conclusion, in our view a corporate governance system based primarily on
ownership and governance by banks is not appropriate at this stage for central Europe and Russia.
This  is not  to say  that such  a system  may  not eventually  be  appropriate.  But  for this  banks  must  be
free from state interference and  subject to  strong competition  from market forces  and  adequate
supervision. Beliefs that the state will continue to bail out banks in difficulties must be credibly
dispelled. Clearly, some progress has been made on all these fronts in the last few years. Nonetheless
we are convinced that much more needs to be done before an active role of banks in governance based
on ownership can be envisaged. Interviews with bank managers in the region have reinforced our view
and lead us to believe that banks' involvement in corporate governance based on ownership interests
will remain marginal in the  foreseeable future.  There may  however be benefits  from allowing a
limited role for some banks to own equity and restructure firms that have defaulted on loans to the
bank. This would enable them to obtain experience in the ownership and governance of firms that may
bear fruit later when the banking system is in a position to play a more active role in this area.
The arguments we advance to make our case against a major role of banks in the ownership
and control of non-financial firms might be understood as suggesting that existing banks in some
countries should not lend either in current circumstances. This question has been subject to heated
debate before, but is not addressed here. The reason is that we feel in all the countries under review
the decision to build a functioning banking system on the basis of existing banks has been taken. The
question now  is not what to do  with the existing banks, but how to develop them  into efficient
intermediaries as quickly as possible. The contribution of this paper to this debate is to point out that
tight restrictions on the ownership of non-financial firms should form part of the strategy to develop
an efficient financial industry.
I  See for example, Hoshi, Kashyap and Loveman (1994).  Others advocating a primary role for banks in the
governance of firms include van Wijnbergen (1992), Corbett and Mayer(1991),  Scharfstein (1992) and Sarcinelli (1992).
2Section 11 analyses corporate governance systems in the West. We compare the market-
based system in the United States to the more bank-based systems in Japan and Germany. No attempt
is made to evaluate which system is the best. The focus is on the conditions necessary for different
models of corporate governance to flourish.
Section  III  analyses the  current conditions  existing  in  central and  eastern Europe.  We
concentrate on the degree of liquidity of corporate securities markets, the restructuring requirements of
firms, and  conditions in the banking sector including the degree of state influence, the bad  debt
burden, competition, supervision, and the incentives banks face with regard to their asset portfolio.
Section  IV  draws the threads  of the  two  previous  sections together  and  compares the
conditions necessary for successful operation of the various governance models in the west with the
existing conditions in the transition countries. Implications are drawn for the appropriate role of banks
in the ownership and governance of firms.
I.  The Role of Banks in Corporate Governance  in the West
As  a  field of research, comparative corporate governance is  in  its  infancy. The  major
industrialised countries in  the west  appear to  present us  with  dramatically different  institutional
arrangements  for  corporate  governance.  Yet  we  lack  a  consensus  as  to  why  these  different
arrangements came about, what the advantages and disadvantages of each system are, and whether one
system is clearly better at the resolution of agency problems between the various stakeholders of the
firm. This poses a problem for scholars attempting to derive lessons from the west for the countries in
central  Europe  and  Russia  undergoing  the  transition  from  socialism.  In  putting  forward
recommendations for these countries on the role of banks in corporate governance, this paper will
consequently be somewhat circumspect. It will try to identify common points of agreement among
researchers on westem models of corporate governance, and derive implications for the countries in
transition.
We start with a description of the corporate governance mechanisms in the U.S., Japan and
Germany. Particular attention is paid to the role of banks and their ownership of firms in each country.
Then we describe the main costs and benefits of having banks play a primary role in the governance
mechanism through the ownership of  firms. We do  not draw any conclusions about the  relative
superiority of one  western model over another.  Instead we  identify the underlying  conditions of
capital markets,  the  restructuring requirements of  firms,  and  bank  supervision, governance  and
competition that appear necessary for the successful operation of each system. By comparing these
requirements with the existing conditions in central Europe and Russia, we draw implications for the
feasibility of the different western models in the transition countries.
A.  Western  Models  of Corporate  Governance
We describe the role of banks in the corporate governance mechanism in the U.S., Japan and
Germany, with a particular focus on three important characteristics of the mechanism in each country:
the structure of corporate ownership, bank-enterprise relations, and the market for corporate control.
The structure of corporate ownership
Differences in the ownership of firms across countries are illustrated to  some degree by
simple inspection of the aggregate statistics on the ownership of listed companies in table 1. Table I
reveals the  far heavier weight  of banks  in  Japan compared to  the  U.S.  Germany appears to  lie
somewhere between Japan and the U.S. in terms of bank ownership of corporate equity. In Germany,
3however, banks have wide powers to exercise the voting rights owned by  individuals but held  in
trust.2
Table 1
Ownership  of common  stock  in 1990
Percentage  of outstanding  shares  owned
All corporations ...................  44.5  72.9  64.0
Financial  institutions  ...........  30.4  48.0  22.0
Banks  ...................  0  18.9  10.0
Insurance  Companies  ......  4.6  19.6
Pension  funds;  ....................  20.1  19.5  1  l2.0
Other  ...................  5.7  J
Non-financial  corporations  14.1  24.9  42.0
Individuals  .............  ......  50.2  22.4  17.0
Foreign  ...................  5.4  4.0  14.0
Government  ...................  0  0.7  5.0
Sources:  US Federal  Reserve  Flow of Funds,  Japanese  Flow of Funds,  Deutsche  Bundesbank  Monthly
Report.
These aggregate figures, however, reveal nothing about the concentration of ownership nor
who  the  large  shareholders are  in  a  typical  firm,  which  is  important  from a  corporate control
perspective. Table 2 gives some data on ownership concentration in a sample of large, listed U.S.,
Japanese and  German  nonfinancial  firms.  The  table  highlights  a  number  of  differences:  first,
ownership concentration varies quite widely across countries. In the U.S. the largest 5 shareholders
hold on average about a quarter of the outstanding shares of the firm. Ownership concentration is
significantly higher in Japan, but is by far the highest in German companies, where the holdings of the
largest 5 shareholders average over 40 percent. In addition, voting power in German firms may be
more  concentrated than  even  these data  suggest.  As mentioned above,  banks in  Germany  have
traditionally been given a wide latitude to vote the shares they hold in trust for smaller shareholders.
Proxy votes exercised by the banks on behalf of beneficial shareholders  are very important in the large
German corporations,  and  concentrate voting  rights in  the  hands  of  the  banks.3 This  may  be
particularly  important in those few widely held  companies in  Germany where small  shareholders
typically deposit their shares with the banks. 4 Finally, many large German firms exhibit a pyramid
holding  company  structure, where  ownership  is  concentrated in  successive  layers  of  holding
2  The law on proxy  voting  has been  tightened  over  the years  but it still appears  to confer  a wide power  to banks
to vote stock according  to their wishes. Purrucker  (1983)  has estimated  that 95 percent of private shareholders  do not
make use of their rights to instruct the bank on voting  matters,  leaving the bank with substantial  discretionary  voting
power.
3  For example, of the 100 largest  AGs in Germany  in 1978,  banks  had a combined  voting power (from their
direct  holdings and proxies)  of greater  than 25% in 41 of them. In the 56 AGs in which banks  had a combined  voting
power of greater than 5% their average  share of the vote was almost 57%.  In the remaining  44 AGs, there existed a
dominant  nonbank shareholder  owning  greater  than a 25% stake, but even among these firms, banks often held large
combined  voting  stakes.
4  Even those companies  that are widely held in terms of beneficial  ownership  may have their voting rights
concentrated  in the hands of a few banks. For  example,  Pfeiffer  (1989)  reports  that throughout  most of the 1980's,  the big
3 universal  banks controlled  over  half the voting  rights  in BASF,  a widely  held company.
4companies, many of which are ultimately controlled by either a wealthy family or a bank (see Prowse
(1994)).  This  structure serves  to  increase  the  control of  banks over  firms through their  equity
ownership.
Table 2
Summary statistics  of ownership  concentration  of large
non-financial  corporations
Percentage  of outstanding  shares  owned  by the largest  five shareholders
Mean  ...................  25.4  33.1  41.5
Median  .........  ..........  20.9  29.7  37.0
Standard  deviation  ..................  16.0  13.8  14.5
Minimum  ............  ........  1.3  10.9  15.0
Maximum  ............  .......  87.1  85.0  89.6
Mean  firm sizel
(millions  of US$,  1980)  .........  3,505  1,835  3,483
Mean  firm size 2
(millions  of US$,  1980)  .........1  1,287  811  1,497
I  Measured  by total assets. 2 Measured  by market  value  of equity.
Samples:  United States:  457 non-financial  corporations  in 1980.
Japan:  143  mining  and  manufacturing  corporations  in 1984.
Germany:  41 non-financial  corporations  in 1990.
Sources:  For the  United States  and Japan,  Prowse  (1992);  for  Germany,  Prowse (1993). Size data
converted  to US$,  using  1980  average  exchange  rates  and  deflated  by US  consumer  prices.
One major reason for the differences in the ownership of enterprises by banks are differences
in the legal and regulatory environment in the three countries. Banks in the U.S. are simply prohibited
from owning any stock on their own account, while bank holding companies cannot own more than 5
percent of the firm and their holdings must be passive. Japanese commercial banks are not prohibited
from owning corporate stock, although they are subject to anti-monopoly regulations that until 1987
limited a  single bank's holdings of a  single firm's shares to  10 percent (the limit has  since been
lowered to  5 percent).  Banks in  Germany  can hold  whatever share of  equity they  like  in  any
nonfinancial firm, limited only by a number of prudential rules which do not appear to be particularly
binding.
Bank-enterprise relationships
There are likely similar differences between countries in the ownership concentration of debt
claims on firms, although the available data is much more sparse. The greater reliance on securities
markets than on intermediated markets for debt finance in the U.S. (illustrated in table 3) may be
taken as a rough indicator that fragmentation of debt claims is higher there than in Japan or Germany.
A  second indicator may be  differences in the regulatory limits on  banks' exposures to individual
customers--these limits are  generally less  binding in  Germany and  Japan  than  in  the U.S..  For
example, in the U.S., banks are limited to lending  15% of their capital to an individual borrower,
whereas in Japan and Germany the limits are 30% and 50% respectively. 5 There are also legal and
regulatory differences in the degree to which investors are permitted to take debt and equity stakes in
5  See Borio  (1990).
5the same firm. The legal doctrine of equitable subordination discourages all creditors in the U.S. from
taking an equity position in the borrower, since the creditors are potentially liable to subordination
should they be perceived to exert control over the firm.
Table 3
Composition of companies' credit market debt, 1985
In percentages
..  ---.. Unit  tites  .. n......
Intermediated debt .................  45  9  1  94
of which,
from banks  .....................  36  n.a.  88
Securities  .....................  55  9  6
Note:  Credit  market  debt  excludes trade  debt.  Intermediated  debt  refers  to  loans  from  financial
intermediaries. Securities includes commercial paper and other short-term  bills  and long-term bonds.
Sources: Borio (1990) and national data.
Differences in the strength of bank-firm relationships are consequently significant. Bank-
enterprise relations in Japan have traditionally been very strong. Not only have banks typically held
equity in firms, they have also been an extremely important source of financing. From  1970 to 1985,
for example, Japanese firms relied on loans from financial institutions for more than 40% of their total
financing needs (table 4). This may have given the main bank of a Japanese firm effective control over
the firm's access to working capital and thus a much enhanced power to influence the firm's activities.
In Germany, the story is somewhat different. German firms have never relied heavily on banks to
finance their investment needs, because they have obtained most of their finance from internal funds. 6
From 1970 to 1985, for example, German firms raised only about 20% of total funds from financial
institutions (primarily banks). What governance power the banks have does not appear to stem from
any control over the firm's access to funds. 7 In the U.S., banks don't own  equity nor are they  an
important source of funds to the typical large firm. Bank-firm relationships in the U.S. are typically
arms length.
The strength of bank-firm ties in Japan is reflected in the frequency with which creditors are
simultaneously equity holders of firms. For example, Prowse (1990) reports that in over 40% of a
sample of large Japanese manufacturing firms the largest debtholder was also the largest shareholder;
6  This is partly a function of the differing institutional arrangements for pension provision in Germany.  About
two-thirds of the funds earmarked for the payment of private pensions is retained by the company as an unfunded liability.
Only the remainder is invested outside the company via private pension funds.  The funds retained by the company are
used for  general corporate purposes.  The result is that  there is less capital available  for the capital market  and less
demand for outside financing than in Anglo-Saxon countries where the bulk of private pensions  are channelled through
private pension funds (see Edwards and Fisher (1994)).  The Japanese private pension system is relatively small compared
to the public pension system and is funnelled largely through the banking system via trust banks.
7  It is true that as universal banks, German banks typically underwrite equity and bond offerings by the firm,
giving them more influence  in this sense than Japanese banks, which are precluded from acting  as investment banks.
However, the low demand by German firms for external finance means that this power may not amount to much.
6on average the largest debtholder held almost one quarter of the firm's outstanding debt and over 5%
of the firms outstanding equity, while the largest 5 debtholders of the firm held over half of the firm's
debt and almost 20% of its equity. In contrast, Clyde (1989) finds in a sample of U.S. Fortune 500
companies that in only a few cases do any of the largest 5 shareholders hold any of the firm's debt and
that in these few cases the debtholdings of the largest shareholders  are minuscule.
Table  4
Gross  funding  of non-financial  corporations,  1970-85
As a percentage of total gross financing
Retentions  ......  ................  52  76
External  finance  .48  24
of which:
Intermediated  debt  41  21
Securities  .7  3
Note: Total gross financing  excludes  trade credit and some  overseas  financing.  Intermediated
debt refers to loans  from financial  institutions.  Securities  includes  public equity and short and
long-term  bills  and  bonds.
Sources:  OECD Financial  Statistics,  Part  Ill and national  data.
Marketfor  corporate control
Another dramatic difference between the U.S. and Germany or Japan is the frequency of
mergers and acquisitions. The market for corporate control is much less active in Japan and Germany.
Data on the volume of completed domestic merger and acquisition transactions for the second half of
the 1980's is displayed in table 5, which reveals large differences between countries. Part of the reason
for the greater merger activity in the U.S. is of course the larger number of companies listed on the
U.S. stock market. However, even normalising the dollar value of mergers and acquisitions by stock
market capitalisation fails to alter the impression that the merger market is much more active in the
U.S.--15 to 20 times more so according to table 5.8
The differences across  countries  in the  frequency of hostile  take-overs are  even  more
striking. 9 Since  WWII,  for  example,  there  have  only  been  4  successful hostile  take-overs  in
Germany. 10They appear almost as rare in Japan. Kester (1991) claims that the use of take-overs as a
device for replacing inefficient management in large Japanese firms is very infrequent. Conversely, in
the U.S. almost 10% of the Fortune 500 in 1980 has since been acquired in a transaction that was
hostile or started off as hostile.
8  Other  empirical  evidence  supports  the claim that mergers  and acquisitions  in Japan  are far lower  than in the
U.S..  Kaplan  (1993a)  finds that just over  2% of his sample of large  Japanese  firms are taken over or merged  between
1980-89  in contrast  to over 22% of his sample  of large U.S.  firms.
9  Hostile  take-overs  are thought  to be motivated  by corporate  control  considerations  to a greater  extent than
friendly  mergers.
I10  See Franks  and Mayer  (1993).
7Table 5
Average annual volume of completed domestic mergers and corporate
transactions with disclosed values, 1985-89
Volume  (in  billions  of USS)..  1,070  61.3  4.2
As  a percentage  of  total
market  capitalisation  ............  41.1  3.1  2.3
Dollar  values  calculated  at current  exchange  rates  for each  of the  five  years  covered.  Market  capitalisation
figures  are  for 1987,  converted  to dollars  at  prevailing  exchange  rates.
Sources:  For the United  States  and Germany,  Securities  Data  Corporation,  Mergers  and Corporate
Transactions  database;  for Japan,  Yamaichi  Securities  Corporation,  as  reported  in Beiter  (1991).
B.  The Role of Banks In Corporate Governance in the West
In the U.S., the banks' primary role in the corporate governance mechanism is through their
role as lenders. Even here the equitable subordination fear may make banks reluctant to play a big role
in the governance of the firm. They typically own no equity in the firm, are infrequently represented
on  the  board,  and  maintain  only  arms-length  relationships with  their  borrowers.  Their  main
governance tool appears to be covenants they insert in the loan contract and the maturity they set for
the loan.
This does not mean however that banks do not exert control over firms in the U.S. when the
law allows them  to do  so. For example, in firms that file for bankruptcy or restructure their debt
privately, bank lenders and other financial institutions with debt outstanding to the firm frequently
receive significant blocks of voting stock, appoint their representatives to the board of directors, and
insert restrictive covenants in the companies' restructured lending agreements to give them more say
in the firm's investment and financing policies (see Gilson (1990)).!  1 U.S. firms that undergo financial
distress thus appear to take on some of the characteristics that the typical Japanese and German firms
exhibit--notably, high ownership concentration, large equity and debt stakes held by banks and bank
representation on the board of directors.
In Japan,  the corporate control framework is related to the  "keiretsu" form of corporate
organisation, where a group of firms based in different industries are centred around a bank. The
nonfinancial firms in the group tend to have product market links among them, and take small equity
stakes in each other. They all tend to have strong but not exclusive borrowing links with the banks
and  other financial institutions in the keiretsu, who also take large equity stakes  in them.  While
individual banks will take stakes of less than 10% in firms, collectively banks will own about 20% of
the  firm, and banks  and life insurance companies together may  own  around 35-40%. Ownership
concentration is relatively high, as is the concentration of debt claims. Collectively, banks are the
most important large shareholders of firms and until recently have also been their only major source
of  external finance. Consequently, they  have  had  a  potentially very powerful  position  as active
monitors of management either through the board or more informally through the Presidents Club
11  U.S.  law allows  banks a significantly  more  active  role  in the governance  of the firm once it defaults  on loans
owed  to the bank.
8meetings, and by controlling the firm's access to external funds. Banks monitor firms on a continuous
basis  in the sense of having regular and substantive discussions with management on policy, and
actively intervene in the case of financial distress. The market for corporate control among large firms
is  inactive. Hostile  take-overs and  other  transactions between  firms involving  corporate control
changes are rare. This does not mean that management turnover in response to poor performance is
infrequent, merely that it occurs by other means, namely pressure from banks.
In Germany there appears to be more reliance on nonbank direct  shareholder monitoring
than in Japan. Ownership concentration is very high among large firms, high enough to give the large
shareholders large incentives to monitor management. 12 Banks generally take small stakes directly in
firms (with some important exceptions such as Daimler-Benz in which Deutsche Bank has a 25%
stake) but monitor and exert control through proxy votes, a pyramid structure of holding companies
and representation on the supervisory board (often in the chairman position). Banks appear to have the
potential to engage in monitoring and influencing management particularly in the diffusely held firms
where their  control of voting rights may  be  important. They appear to  have  much  less control
(compared to Japanese banks) over firms through their control of external sources of finance, since
German firms rely more on internally generated funds. Hostile take-overs are almost non-existent. The
success of the Gernan corporate control mechanism appears, in brief, to stand on the ability of large
shareholders, often banks, to monitor management.
C.  Costs  and Benefits  of Banks  Having  a Primary  Role  in the
Ownership  and Governance  of Firms
The  academic  literature  suggests a  number  of  potential  advantages,  from  a  corporate
governance perspective, of a system that allows large equity and debtholders of the  firm to be the
same agents, that encourages the concentrated holding of debt and equity claims, and that restricts
firm's sources of external finance to  one investor. 13 The legal and regulatory environment of the
German and Japanese economies has encouraged this concentration of firm's claims in the hands of
banks to  a  much greater extent than  that  of the  U.S.. It  has also  given  the  banks--in Japan  in
particular--a potentially very effective monitoring role by allowing them to control much of the firm's
external financing. A priori  then, one  might expect that the German and Japanese model would
encourage a more efficient form of corporate governance than that in the U.S..
Recent research provides some empirical evidence on this issue. Prowse (1990) finds that
the tendency for financial institutions to take large debt and equity positions in the same firm may
mean that the agency problems of debt finance are lower for firms in Japan than in the U.S., where
institutional investors are prohibited from being  large debt and  equity holders in the  same firm:
leverage ratios are higher in Japanese firms than U.S. firms partly because of their lower agency costs
of debt. Hoshi et al (1990a) find that Japanese firms that are members of keiretsu experience fewer
liquidity effects on investment than those firms that are not members. Keiretsu members typically
have strong ties to  a main  bank, which along with other group  firms, takes  a  significant equity
position  in the  firm and holds a  large fraction of the firm's outstanding debt. They  conclude that
membership of  a  group  and  close  ties  to  a  group main  bank  are  important  in  mitigating the
information problems that are typically associated with external finance and governance. Lichtenburg
and Pushner (1993) provide evidence that suggests that financial institutions are the major monitors of
12  This of course  assumes  that the monitors  are themselves  value-maximisers  which may not necessarily  be the
case. The issue  of "who  monitors  the monitor?"  is addressed  in the following  section.
13  See,  for example,  Stiglitz  (1985).
9firm behaviour in Japan. Japanese firms with high financial institution ownership show higher levels
of productivity and profitability than other Japanese firms.  14
There is less empirical evidence available on Germany. Cable (1985) provided until recently
the only comprehensive analysis of German firm performance and its relation to the tightness of its
bank  ties.  He  provided  evidence that  banks  do  play  an  important  corporate control  function:
profitability among the large German firms was positively related to the proportion of equity voting
rights controlled by the 3 big universal banks, and by bank representation on the board of directors.  15
He concluded that banks did use their control of voting rights and their presence on the board to
monitor and influence management towards profit maximisation. Elston (1993), in a study modelled
on that of Hoshi et al  (1990), finds evidence that firms with tighter bank ties in Germany exhibit
investment functions which  are less sensitive to liquidity constraints than  firms with  weaker ties,
suggesting that bank ties are important in mitigating the information and agency problems associated
with extemal finance and governance. 16
Overall, the general consensus of the existing empirical literature is that strong bank-firm
relationships  may  significantly  reduce  agency  and  information  costs  and  improve  efficiency.
However, there are clearly some potential disadvantages of allowing banks to own equity and to take a
primary role in the governance mechanism of nonfinancial firms.
One potential disadvantage is the  conflicts of  interest such arrangements may  generate
within banks. Saunders (1994) identifies a number of concerns regarding such conflicts of interest.
The most important is that the bank may have incentives to make either subsidised or unsound loans
14  They  also analyse  how financial  institutions  exert their control over firms in which they have large stakes.
They distinguish between two methods of monitoring:  continuous  direct monitoring  of the firm versus significant
intervention  in the firm's business  only  after the firm has encountered  financial  difficulties. They find that high financial
institution  ownership  reduces  both the severity  and the  frequency  of lapses from efficiency  and profitability.  This would
suggest  that,  in some  contrast  to the conventional  wisdom  on how Japanese  financial  institutions  behave towards  the firms
which they own,  financial  institutions  conduct  both types of intervention.  The conventional  wisdom  has been that banks
use their monitoring  and disciplining  role only  in times  of financial  distress. See Sheard  (1989).
15  The 3 big universal  banks  are Deutsche  Bank,  Dresdner  Bank  and Commerzbank.
16  Edwards  and Fisher (1994) take issue with much of the conventional  wisdom  on the role of banks in the
corporate  governance  system  in Germany. They  present a variety  of evidence  suggesting  banks may not have the degree
of influence  as lenders,  shareholders,  voters of proxies,  or representatives  on the board  as has been widely  thought. They
find that bank control of  voting  rights is only  weakly related  to the number  of bank representatives  on the supervisory
board, a result somewhat  at odds with  the belief that banks use their control  of voting  rights  to further their control over
management.  (Though  not completely  inconsistent  if banks use their votes to elect members  to the supervisory  board
who are sympathetic  to bank interests even though they are not themselves  bankers--a  distinct possibility  in Germnany
where  there  has been a tradition  of criticism  of the banks for exerting  undue  influence  over firms,  and where there  may be
a strong incentive  for banks  to conceal  their influence.) They  also find that bank representation  on the supervisory  board
does not mean  that the firm borrows  more from banks,  again  something  that might  be expected  if banks used their board
membership  to reduce  the costs of providing  external  finance to the firm.  As Edwards  and Fisher admit, the evidence
provided both for and against the importance  of banks in the corporate  control function of German firms is very
incomplete. Probably  the most that can be said about the issue at the moment  is that while it is likely that banks in
Germany  probably  play some role in the corporate  control of firms,  it is unclear that they play the primary  role.  The
structure  of corporate  ownership  in Germany  presented  earlier suggests  that nonfinancial  firms and individuals  that are
large shareholders  may play an equally important  role as banks.  Indeed,  Edwards  and Fisher's  results  may be a product
of the fact that banks  play an important  corporate  governance  role  only in those  firms that are widely  held and that do not
enjoy  the benefits  of  large shareholder  monitoring.  The Monopolkommission's  (1978)  findings  that banks' voting  power
from direct  holdings  and from proxies  is greatest  in those firms  which  are widely  held is consistent  with this view.
10to enterprises in which it has an equity stake. Such practices might ultimately threaten the safety of
the bank itself. 17
Another potential disadvantage is that allowing banks to  invest in equity as well  as debt
might lead to an increase in the risk of bank failure. By their very nature equity investments involve
more risk than do loans. Allowing banks to take equity stakes in firms could therefore increase the
riskiness of the banking system and the potential cost to the deposit insurance system. Of course it is
not clear whether expanding the permissible asset class for bank investments will result in an overall
increase or decrease in bank risk. Allowing banks to invest in equity could conceivably lower overall
bank risk by allowing the bank more avenues for diversification and opportunities to hedge their loan
risk more effectively. Although this issue has not been addressed directly by researchers, it has been
addressed in the context of empirical investigations into the possible effect on overall bank risk of the
introduction of universal banking in the U.S. (see  Saunders and  Walter (1994)). The bulk of the
research on  this issue suggests that in fact there are potential risk reduction gains  from allowing
commercial banks to expand into universal banking activities. However, these empirical results are
very hard to translate into implications for banks  in the transition countries with their drastically
different conditions and environment.  18
A  final possible disadvantage in allowing banks to  own equity in firms stems from the
power a large equity holding confers on a bank to influence the firm to take out loans from the bank
(or purchase other bank services) at premium prices. The bank may thus be able to extract rents from
the firm by virtue of its large equity stake in it. Here the equity stake held by the bank may frustrate
the ability of the firm to take advantage of a competitive loan market. This problem may be all the
more important in banking systems where there is not much competition in the first place.
Empirical evidence about the importance of these potential disadvantages of allowing banks
to own equity in firms is scarce. The Gessler Commission (1979), in its study of universal banking
arrangements in Germany, concluded that potential conflicts of interest in universal banking probably
were only responsible for minor restraints of competition that could be remedied by marginal changes
in the law. It appears that most of the potential disadvantages mentioned above can be substantially
mitigated by a combination of a high degree of competition in the banking and financial sector and a
sophisticated  and  intensive  prudential  supervision  and  regulation  of  banks.  Absent  such  an
environment, of course, these arguments are likely to take on a much greater importance. In particular,
they are likely to be far more relevant for the transition countries
D.  Requirements  for the Efficient  Operation  of the Different  Systems
In analysing the relevant lessons for eastern Europe and Russia, a clear understanding of the
conditions necessary for the successful operation of each system observed in the west is needed. What
are the requirements of the different systems in the west in terms of liquid capital markets, the severity
of the information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders, the independence and governance of
the banking system, the degree of competition within the banking system, and the type of monitoring
17  Other potential conflicts of interest involve i) the bank restricting the supply of credit to an enterprise that is
a competitor with an enterprise in which the bank has an equity stake (an "affiliate"), ii) the bank passing on privileged
information about a borrower to competing affiliates, and iii) the bank using its lending powers to tie customers in to the
products of affiliated enterprises.
18  This is partly because the introduction of universal banking involves a very wide expansion of bank powers--
into  insurance  and  corporate  securities  underwriting--in  addition  to  the  holding  (and  trading)  of  corporate  equity
securities.  Thus the results cited here probably do not have much to say on the narrower issue of the effect on bank risk of
the holding of equity securities.  In addition, and perhaps more important for the focus of this paper, banks in the U.S. are
completely  different  entities  from  their  namesakes  in  the  transition  countries  in terms  of  their  sophistication,  the
reputations they have at stake, and the supervisory and competitive environment.
11and restructuring that firms require? The requirements of each system can then be compared with the
existing conditions in eastem Europe and Russia and  some implications for the operation of each
system under these conditions can then be drawn.
Capital market liquidity
The  Anglo-Saxon system  of  corporate  govemance relies  crucially  on  liquid  securities
markets which can transmit new information rapidly and efficiently and which come close to being
efficient markets in the sense that there is a large amount of publicly available information about the
financial and  operating characteristics of  firms which  is  incorporated into prices.  Without  such
conditions,  hostile  take-overs become  virtually impossible. In contrast,  the  German or  Japanese
system of large shareholder monitoring by banks and others does not rely at all on liquid corporate
securities markets and may even be hindered by their presence.
The Anglo-Saxon requirement for capital market liquidity means a requirement for a large
amount of publicly available information about firms so that the information asymmetries between
insiders and outsiders are not severe. If they were, outside investors would never risk their money by
buying corporate securities, and a corporate securities market would consequently be very illiquid. It
is not a coincidence that corporate disclosure requirements in the US are much more comprehensive
and demanding than those in Japan and Germany (see Prowse (1994)). Capital market liquidity not
only requires large amounts of information be available to outside investors, but also that there be
sufficient expertise among outsiders (investment banks, ratings agencies, buyout firms, and take-over
specialists) to analyse, interpret and understand the financial and operating information disclosed by
firms, so as to evaluate whether a firm is being run badly or not. In the German and Japanese systems,
this expertise is also required but need only be concentrated amongst the large shareholders who, as
insiders, have access to the appropriate information and do most of the monitoring. There is thus very
likely to  be  a  lower  requirement for  such expertise overall  in  the  Japanese or  German system
compared to the Anglo-Saxon system.
Some authors claim that the role of the large, active shareholder in Germany and Japan is
buttressed by or may even require the existence of illiquid securities markets. One reason proposed for
this is that illiquid equity markets preclude the possibility of large equity blockholders simply selling
their stakes in firms in which they become dissatisfied ("exit"), thereby increasing the incentives for
large  shareholders to monitor  and  influence management ("voice") (see  Coffee (1991)).  Another
reason may be that in undeveloped capital markets firms often have only one source of extemal capital
- bank  loans. This  sole  reliance on  banks  for  extemal  finance may  strengthen banks'  corporate
governance role by giving them control over the cash raised by the firm to  finance activities  (see
Scharfstein (1992) and Prowse (1994)).
There is some evidence - particularly from Japan - that the existence of illiquid securities
markets contributes importantly to the power of large shareholders to monitor the firm and indeed that
they  may  be  a  necessary condition  for  the  large  shareholder system to  operate efficiently.  For
example, in Japan corporate securities markets until the early  1980's were very illiquid. In addition,
banks have traditionally been very important providers of extemal finance to firms through their role
as lenders. As capital markets have been deregulated in Japan and firms have had access to a wide
variety of sources of finance apart from bank loans, their reliance on bank loans has fallen sharply. If
the banks' role as corporate monitors depended crucially on their role as providers of extemal finance
to  firms we  might expect that their effectiveness as monitors may  have declined recently. Some
evidence suggests that this is indeed the case. Hoshi et al (1990b, 1993) provide evidence of agency
problems among Japanese firms, the  source of which appear to be the increasing accessibility to
nonbank finance. They find that despite the advantages they document for Japanese firms from tight
bank relationships in terms of less information problems and liquidity restraints, many Japanese firms
were actively reducing the strength of their bank ties in the  1980's as deregulation led to  many
12opportunities for external finance apart from bank finance. They analyse the firms that have increased
their use of the public debt markets and reduced their reliance on bank loans. They find that more
profitable and successful firms, as well as less successful firms in which managers have significant
share ownership, have been the most aggressive in reducing their reliance on banks.19 Their findings
indicate that the corporate control mechanism in Japan may have ceased to operate as effectively as it
had done over the period when the legal and regulatory environment precluded firms from tapping
nonbank sources of extemal finance.
In Germany, the story is somewhat different. The German financial system has  typically
been  characterised  by  illiquid  and  shallow  securities  markets.  This  may  have  induced  large
shareholders to exert voice rather than exit. However, as mentioned earlier, despite the absence of
many alternatives to bank loans German firms have never relied heavily on  banks to finance their
investment needs. What governance power the banks have does not appear to stem from any control
over the firm's access to funds.
In sum, while deep and liquid corporate securities markets are clearly a necessary condition
for the operation of the Anglo-Saxon system of corporate  governance, there is some evidence that they
may be a hindrance to the operation of the Japanese model. This is clearly of importance to eastern
European countries which currently have very underdeveloped capital markets and are considering
whether to devote resources to making them more liquid.
Governance of banks
The German/Japanese system requires that the institutions that are the primary monitors
perform their monitoring function properly. How is this ensured? In other words, who monitors the
monitor? In most German and Japanese banks, there appears to be no large shareholder to perform
such "monitoring of the monitor". Banks in both Germany and Japan are typically widely held (see
Prowse (1994)), suggesting that this  may be an important issue  in both these countries. Diamond
(1984) has demonstrated that under certain conditions, banks can alleviate problems of monitoring the
performance of enterprises and financial institutions. By investing in a large number of firms, banks
smooth their earnings and are able to offer investors fixed return debt (deposit) contracts. By issuing
debt, managers of banks are provided with incentives to  maximise the  performance of the  firm.
However, there  are  a  number  of  real  world  complications that  may  cloud  the  applicability  of
Diamond's result to the German and Japanese banks. The most important is the existence of deposit
insurance, which removes depositors' incentives to penalise banks, through higher interest rates, if the
bank does not monitor efficiently.
The  monitoring  function  may  also  be  performed  in  part  by  the  banking  supervision
authorities.  Japan  and  Germany  have  fairly  intensive  prudential  supervision  and  regulation
frameworks with which to monitor and control banks. Admittedly, the primary focus is to protect the
government from failure of the bank rather than the maximisation of bank equity value, which is what
would  ensure optimal  monitoring behaviour by  the bank. However, adequate supervision  would
presumably mitigate one of the conflict of interest problems that Saunders (1994) identifies--namely
19  They interpret these findings in the following way:  First, because intermediated  finance involves a
significant amount of monitoring by the bank, it has costs that successful firms with good investment opportunities would
prefer not to bear.  Thus when the opportunity to tap public debt markets arises, these firms react in a profit maximising
way by tapping these  cheaper forms of finance.  However, managers of all  firms have incentives to tap such finance,
because they will then be subject to less scrutiny and monitoring from stakeholders and will have more opportunity to
shirk.  Thus firms in which managers are entrenched may also be expected to reduce their reliance on banks and finance
themselves through the public markets.  In this case  their response is not  the profit maximising one, but the one that
maximises  the  managers'  preferences.  Hoshi  et  al's  evidence point  to  there  being  some  degree  of  management
entrenchment in Japanese firms.
13that banks would not easily be able to make unsound or subsidised loans to affiliates in financial
distress.
Ultimately, whether or not the "who monitors the monitor?" issue is a problem for Germany
and Japan is a matter of empirical evidence, of which we have little to date. However, it is clear that
the German and Japanese model work more efficiently the greater are the incentives for the banks to
perform efficient monitoring of the firms they own and lend to. Regardless of how well banks monitor
in  Germany and  Japan, this  issue  clearly acquires great  significance for  the countries of  eastern
Europe, where  the issue  is likely to  be important since banks are still  state owned, suffer from
incentive problems,  and  are subject to  fairly  weak prudential  supervision and  regulation by  the
banking authorities.
Competition among banks
Given the potential for conflicts of interest in a system that allows banks to own equity in
firms, the greater degree of competition in the banking system, the less this potential is likely to be a
reality. For example, many of the conflicts of interest that a bank might be susceptible to would be
mitigated to the extent that competitive market conditions imposed external discipline--through the
loss of reputation--on the bank. Competitive conditions in the banking system would for example,
make  product  market tie  ins  impossible  for  a  bank to  insist upon.  Similarly  it  would  make  it
impossible for a bank to threaten to disrupt credit flows to the competitor of an affiliate. And the
incentive to pass on private information to affiliates about their competitors who borrow from the
bank would be mitigated by the threatened loss of reputation.
One reason these problems have not appeared to be serious in Japan and Germany may well
be because their banking systems are reasonably competitive (see Corbett and Mayer (1991)). There
are large numbers of banks and concentration levels tend to be low. For example, the 13 largest city
banks in Japan held just under half of all banking assets in 1986, and in Germany the 6 largest banks
accounted for less than  10% of all banking assets. However, this issue is clearly of importance for
eastern Europe, where the concentration of the banking system is much higher.
Restructuring problems of enterprises
The  most effective system of corporate governance for  any particular firm  is likely  to
depend on its line of business, its stage in the life cycle, and the technological and market conditions
it faces. For example,  old established firms in basic industries suffering from large over capacity
problems that need to downsize by selling off assets, cutting capacity, laying off workers and cutting
wages may be subject to a particular set of agency and information problems that are quite different
from a young firm in an expanding industry that needs to invest large arpnunts of capital in research
and development in order to stay competitive. These different agency and information problems can
plausibly be addressed more efficiently by particular corporate governance mechanisms rather than
others.
What can we say about how corporate control arrangements are suited to different problems
of adjustment and restructuring? First,  there is evidence that  hostile take-overs are a  particularly
effective mechanism of achieving the painful restructuring required of a firm in an industry with large
over capacity  problems.  Shleifer and  Vishny  (1989) found that  U.S.  firms suffering  from  such
problems were more likely to undergo a corporate control change through a hostile take-over than
through internally precipitated removal of management by the board of directors. This may be because
hostile take-overs involve the intervention of an outsider who has no previous relationship with the
managers and employees of the firm, and who thus has more freedom to enact the painful measures
necessary for maximisation of equity value (see Shleifer and  Summers (1990)). Conversely, firms
which are governed by a large institutional shareholder (bank or otherwise) may plausibly not be as
14responsive to over capacity conditions by virtue of the long-term relationships that they have built up
with other stakeholders (such as management and workers) over time. 20 Miszei (1994a) claims that
the reliance on the impersonal take-over mechanism has meant that firms in the U.S. in industries
characterised by over capacity have restructured and downsized themselves much more quickly than
firms facing similar requirements in Japan and Europe.
Second, there is evidence that the corporate governance arrangements we observe in risky
start up  firms may be a response to their particular needs. These needs are typically for an active
investor that brings with him not only capital but also an expertise in the marketing, accounting and
financial aspects of the firm's operations. Sahlman (1991) and Fenn et al (1994) describe the corporate
governance arrangements of venture capital firms in the U.S. as being dramatically different from
those of large firms. Venture capital firms typically have an active investor (the venture capitalist)
who takes a majority equity stake in the firm, sits on the board, finds other sources of capital for the
firm if necessary, and provides marketing, financial and technical expertise to the firm. This  large
shareholder role seems particularly suited to mitigating the problems facing risky start up firms where
the  original  management team may  have  plenty  of technical expertise but  little  or no  business
expertise.
Third, Franks and Mayer (1992) speculate that there are certain lines of business that  are
likely to benefit more from the Japanese or German style of corporate governance and others that
benefit from the U.S. style. They suggest that the U.S. system is best suited to situations in which
corporate activities involve subjective assessments of future prospects and evaluation of the quality of
employees and managers is of little relevance, on the assumption that the market for corporate control
is really a market for corporate strategy with managers competing for the rights to implement their
preferred strategies. They assert that  this function is quite different from the one performed by the
German or Japanese system which relies on banks to be active investors. The primary role that the
main bank or Hausbank plays in corporate governance along with other interested stakeholders (such
as suppliers and customers) ensures that the influential parties have a lot of information about the
quality  of management and employees. Thus  the German or Japanese system is particularly well
suited  to  evaluating  managerial  performance in  industries  where  there  are  standard  operating
procedures and known skills that can be evaluated.
Franks and Mayer associate the former type of activities where the U.S. system is preferred
with more speculative risky industries such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. The German or
Japanese system may be superior in lines of business associated with standard methods of production
where  there  are  known  skills that  can  be  transferred from one  firm  to  another,  such as  basic
manufacturing. It  may be  no accident that  the comparative performance of different countries  in
different  industries appears  to  be  related  to  the  advantages  of  alternative corporate governance
systems. 2 1
What implications does this have for central Europe and Russia? Ultimately it depends upon
the view one takes of the nature of the restructuring activity facing the firms in these countries. The
restructuring requirements of firms in eastern Europe and Russia are likely to be quite diverse, with a
large number of firms requiring fairly radical downsizing or even liquidation, but also a  significant
number requiring expansion and investment in new lines methods of production and new lines of
business.  In  almost  all  cases  there will  be a  need  for  the  injection of  expertise  in  marketing,
accounting and  financial operations. In relatively few cases will there be  firms that already have
invested in the most up-to-date operating procedures and require little or no radical restructuring.
20  Although, as Shleifer and Summers point out, these long-term relationships may be of some significant value
in many firms in market economies.
21  Which way the causality runs is of course unclear: the German system may have evolved as a response to its
comparative strength in manufacturing, not the converse.
15Ill.  Exlsting  conditions  In central  Europe  and Russia
The U.S., Japan and Germany  present  us with three  different  models  of the governance  role
of banks. These  models have  unique requirements  in terms of the conditions  under which they can
operate efficiently. These conditions comprise  the degree of liquidity  in the capital markets, the
governance  and supervision  of banks, the degree of competition  within  the banking  system and the
particular  restructuring  needs  of firms.  These  conditions  are  now examined  for the countries  of eastern
Europe  and Russia.
A.  Business  Skills,  Capital  Market  Liquidity,  and  Firm  Restructuring
Requirements
Lack of business skills andfinancial  expertise
Perhaps  the most serious  legacy  of central  planning  is the acute lack of business  skills and
expertise  throughout  all firms, banks included.  Among  nonfinancial  firms there is an urgent  need for
marketing,  accounting  and financial  skills.  Many  managers  need  to acquire  these  skills or be replaced.
Among  banks,  there is a need  for loan evaluation  skills,  which require  accounting  and other financial
expertise.  Under  central  planning  these skills were not needed.  As far as banks  were concerned,  the
rudimentary  banking  system  was in effect  part of the budget.  Its role was to distribute  funds  according
to the plan and to monitor consistency  of expenditures  with the plan. Much of the activity  of the
monobank  and the sector-specific  specialised  banks revolved  around  keeping  accounts  and extending
working  capital  credit in accordance  with plan targets.  In short,  banking  then was equivalent  to book
keeping  by a monopolist. 22 It is not surprising  that banking  skills like evaluating  creditworthiness,
pricing  risk, loan-vetting  procedures  and offering  products  tailored  to customers'  preferences  in order
to attract funds  did not develop  in such  circumstances.
Information asymmetries between firm insiders and outsiders
Firms in the transition countries suffer from an acute asymmetric  information  problem
between insiders and outsiders, in particular  as the systemic transformation  radically altered the
economic  environment  in which  enterprises  were operating.  Changes  in relative  prices,  the collapse  of
CMEA  export  markets,  sudden  import competition,  reduced  subsidies  and the sudden sharp  increase
in real interest  rates  made  a large number  of existing  enterprises  unprofitable  while  others found  their
profit situation improved. This debased the value of  accumulated  information on enterprises,
including  that held  by the banks.  In addition  the lack  of reliable  enterprise  accounting  and the absence
of auditing reduced  the amount of information  outsiders could gather on companies.  Uncertainty
surrounding  the ownership  situation  and the legal framework  has made the situation  more difficult
still. The level of uncertainty  is illustrated  by the fact that in cases where independent  auditors  from
the West were called  in to evaluate  the value of a firm in order to set a sale prices, their estimates
often  differed  by several  hundred  percent.
Capital market liquidity
Severe information  asymmetries  and the lack of expertise  in the transition economies  in
evaluating  information  about  firms  has meant  that securities  markets  have  been very slow  to develop.
Stock markets (with the exception  of the Czech and Slovak Republics)  are small, consisting  of
perhaps the largest  20 to 30 firms in the country.  Corporate  bond markets  are almost non-existent.
22  Sometimes  enterprises  did not have their own accounting  section  and relied mostly  on the account-keeping
services  of banks.
16Further, the institutional and regulatory infrastructure that can provide for the growth of corporate
securities markets is currently lacking in these countries. Bond rating agencies, investment advisory
firms and securities regulatory bodies are in the very early stages of development if they exist at all.
This suggests that it will be a long time before corporate securities markets in the transition countries
approach the breadth and liquidity of even the Japanese and German securities markets, let alone those
of the Anglo-Saxon countries.
Restructuring requirements offirms
The restructuring requirements of firms in eastern Europe and Russia are very diverse. A
large number of firms will have to undergo radical downsizing and even liquidation. Others must be
relieved of their debt  burden and restructured. In almost all  cases there  is an urgent need  for  a
complete reorientation of  the management of the business.  This will  require the  replacement of
management in many cases. As Phelps et al (1993) point out, the need to replace old management
with new is hard to underestimate in the transition countries, where the old managers have a skill set
appropriate for success in  a  command economy but  in many cases completely  inappropriate for
success in a market economy. In other firms, the infusion of new funds will be necessary to invest in
new technologies and new lines of business. Finally and perhaps most important, there will almost
always be the need for additional expertise in marketing, accounting and  finance. 23 Obviously  all
these elements are linked. Firms that are well managed will have better access to external finance and
will more quickly attain the necessary business skills. In practice, however, marketing and financial
skills may often be better imported through foreign trade partners or investors.
In sum, there appears to be a premium in the transition economies on a corporate governance
system  which  can  effectively  fire  unsuitable  managers and  that  involves  the  active  investor
contributing to the firm's expertise in financial and accounting skills.
B.  Conditions in the banking sector
Non-performing loans
The appearance of a large portfolio of non-performing loans was to be expected once the
reform of eastern European economies was under way 24. As a result of market-oriented reform and
the  shocks  stemming from  the  collapse  of  CMEA export  markets, a  large  number  of  existing
enterprises became unprofitable. Not surprisingly, a substantial debt overhang developed: many firms
could cover operating costs but were not able to service their debt. Banks were saddled with a large
stock of non-performing loans and often found themselves with negative net worth.
23  The Czech economy  provides a  vivid example of this point.  Arguably,  the Czech's  have advanced  the
furthest  in addressing  problems  of governance  and access  to external  finance by enterprises. Yet, some success  stories
notwithstanding,  a large number  of firms still languish,  suffering  from an acute lack  of marketing  and financial  skills.
24  This and the following  paragraphs  draw on Dittus (1995),  "Bank  reform and behaviour  in central Europe",
Joumal  of Comparative  Economics,  forthcoming.
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Estimates for non-performing loans at the end of 1992 are shown in chart  1.25 It suggests
that about a third of loans were non-performing, although variations between banks are considerable
and average figures have to be interpreted with caution. Many banks were weighed down with large
amounts of non-performing loans. The undesirable incentive effects resulting from a low net worth of
banks are well  known: in many cases they  lead to opportunistic behaviour by bank managers and
owners. Banks have an incentive to "gamble for resurrection" by making risky loans or may engage in
activities which benefit the management and owners at the expense of depositors or, where these are
insured, the taxpayer.
The disincentive effects of a large debt overhang on firms are also well known. Enterprises
are preoccupied by the debt burden instead of focusing on survival in the new market environment. 26
The aim of  financial restructuring is to eliminate the  disincentives stemming from  past  lending.
Bygones should be treated as bygones and should not influence current and future lending decisions.
Countries have addressed problem loans and the resulting weak capital bases in various
ways and have sometimes changed their approach over time. 27 Broadly speaking, two approaches can
be distinguished. The central European countries have  recapitalised their existing banks to  such a
degree that by mid-1994 the portfolio problem of most banks could be considered as being under
control (Dittus (1995)). In the Czech Republic, most of the non-performing loans were carved out of
the commercial banks in 1991. This, together with an additional injection of fresh capital, brought the
25  Non-performing  loans in banks' portfolios are not easily identified because of  inadequate accounting
standards, the only partial availability of portfolio reviews, and tax rules which discouraged provisioning. Moreover, once
many enterprises are illiquid or insolvent they "contaminate" the economic environment if they are allowed to remain in
operation because bankruptcy rules are either weak or not enforced. As they do not pay suppliers, these in turn cannot pay
their suppliers and as payment arrears spread so does the difficulty of distinguishing good from bad enterprises.
26  In addition, a debt overhang makes it very difficult to borrow new funds, even for clearly profitable projects.
Another risk is that borrowers may not behave in a prudent manner as long as they expect a bailout in the future (moral
hazard).
27  This paper does not  summarise or discuss the respective  merits and drawbacks of the different proposals
which have been advanced on how to deal with problem loans; there are numerous  suggestions in the literature.  Early
papers were by Hinds (1990) and Brainard (1991). Convenient summaries do exist, for example in Schmieding and Buch
(1993). Neither  does  the paper describe  in detail the measures  countries have  taken  to tackle  the  problem  of  non-
performing loans; these are analysed in Dittus (1994).
18capital-to-asset ratio of the major banks to  4.5  in  1991. In several rounds of recapitalisation, the
capital-to-asset ratio of Hungarian banks was brought to 4% by mid-1994. Through the issue of sub-
ordinated debt  a  further increase to  8% is  planned by  the  end  of the  year. In  Poland, the  nine
commercial banks which took over the former monobank's assets in 1989 were recapitalised to more
than 8% in 1993.28
In  contrast, in  Russia  the  problem of  non-performing loans  has  been  reduced  through
hyperinflation (Claessens and Pohl (1994)). The broad money supply contracted from 80% of GDP in
1990 to 16% in 1993 and credit to the enterprise and household sector shrunk to a mere 12% of GDP
(chart 2). Even if problem loans as a  share of total loans were large, their size in relation to  GDP
would be modest. Moreover, the contraction of the overall balance sheet of the banking system was
accompanied by a large change in its structure. The share in total assets of the formerly dominating
specialised banks has declined to about a third. For example, Sberbank, which continues to hold most
of the country's savings, now accounts for only 5% of the total29. Two thirds of total banking assets
are held by the about 2000 newly-created banks, of which about 20 to 30 are relatively large (chart 3).
In sum, both in central Europe and in Russia past problem loans have been provided for and therefore
are no longer the most important issue. However, uncertainty with respect to the likelihood of future
bail-outs remains and continues to provide many banks with bad incentives (see below).
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State ownership and influence
At the beginning of the reforms all banks were owned by the state. State-owned banks are
generally bad  at providing  effective corporate control because of political interference in  lending
decisions and the direct dependency of management on government. Even in the absence of direct
interference state banks are likely to give more weight to employment and political considerations
than to narrow financial returns. For banks to play a role in corporate control, therefore, their links to
government need to be severed through privatisation.
28  However, the situation of some other banks, in particular in the cooperative sector, and that of BGZ and the
savings bank remains precarious.
29  Of the old state banks, only Vneshtorgbank (which holds most of the foreign exchange) and Rosselkhozbank
(which channels subsidised credit to agriculture) remain of some importance.
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Generally, bank privatisation in eastern Europe has proceeded at a slower pace than hoped
for. One reason has been that many foreign banks consider the retail markets in eastern Europe still
very risky and are content to focus on a few profitable niches - trade finance, credit to joint ventures,
and services for high net worth individuals. This can be done easily through the opening of a branch
or subsidiary without taking a stake in the large state banks, thereby avoiding the daunting task of
overhauling bureaucracies which have evolved under central planning. It has also taken much longer
to  restructure the banking sector than was initially anticipated. Although governments  in  central
Europe have recognised the importance of putting the banking sector on a sound footing, in some
cases the difficulties of doing so were significantly underestimated at  first. In particular, correctly
valuing bank portfolios has proved extremely difficult, and many more banks than initially anticipated
appeared to have negative net worth. In other cases, it has proved difficult to implement the necessary
measures. The result has been that financial sector reform has lagged, with the exception perhaps of
the Czech Republic where balance sheets were cleaned early in the process.
Privatisation  has proceeded fastest  in  the  Czech Republic.  In  the  first  wave of  mass-
privatisation in 1993, majority stakes in all state banks (with the exception of the Consolidation bank)
were distributed to the public. In Poland, three state banks have been privatised through direct sale,
and  more  are  awaiting  privatisation.  At  several others  political influence  has  been  reduced  by
insulating the management from ministries through a supervisory board. The laggard in privatisation
has been Hungary which privatised the first state bank only this year. The other main banks are still
directly owned by the government. In Russia, the old state banks have not been privatised. However, a
large number of regional branches of these banks, often on oblast level, have established themselves
as independent commercial banks (so-called "spin-offs"),  contributing to the rapid growth of the total
number of banks.
Competition
Competition  in the banking sector has  increased markedly in most countries. In Russia,
market entry has been extremely rapid: the total number of banks has risen within a couple of years
from a handful of state banks to about 2400 banks. Most of these are small and many are owned by
20one or a few enterprises which use them mainly as cheap sources of credit. 30 Nonetheless, about 20 to
30 banks appear to have developed into well-managed commercial banks. Within a  few years these
banks have come to dominate the commercial banking market while the role of the old state banks
which are not involved in the distribution of directed credit has shrunk (see chart 3). Market entry has
been rapid in the Czech Republic and also, though to a lesser degree, in Hungary. The number of
banks with foreign participation (including joint-ventures, subsidiaries and branches) has increased
substantially in these countries (chart 4). The new banks have contributed to heightened competition.
In contrast, the issuance of new banking licences in Poland has been very restrictive. 3 1
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Despite the entry of new banks, the "old" banks, whether privatised or not,  continue to
dominate the lending and deposit business. In the Czech Republic and Poland, the old banks hold
more than 80% of loans and deposits and in Hungary about two thirds. Only in Russia do new banks
dominate the scene, accounting for two-thirds of the banking system's assets.
Another element of competitive pressure, particularly in the Czech Republic and Hungary 32,
has been the access of enterprises to direct lending by foreign banks and of households to instruments
denominated in foreign currency. The amounts borrowed by  enterprises directly from abroad have
risen substantially in the recent past and are likely to exceed $1 billion in the Czech Republic and
Hungary. On the deposit side, foreign currency deposits have become available to households. They
have used their newly-gained freedom to  diversify their portfolios by increasing their holdings of
foreign exchange accounts with domestic banks. As a result banks have to offer interest rates on
domestic currency deposits which, after allowing for devaluation expectations, are competitive with
those offered on foreign exchange accounts.
30  Many of these enterprise-owned banks appear to be plagued by bad loans.  Reportedly, fraudulent and even
criminal behaviour has been quite comrnmon.
31  After more than 50 new banks, mostly small and undercapitalised, had sprung up in the wake of reforms and
presented the authorities with difficulties of supervision, the Polish authorities all but stopped issuing licenses.
32  Until recently, enterprises in Poland found it difficult to tap foreign sources of capital owing to the arrears on
foreign debt. After a settlement was reached with commercial creditors in 1994 direct foreign lending and investment has
tended to increase.
21Overall, competition in all countries has increased substantially. In Russia, the seeds of a
competitive banking market are apparent as a small number of new banks make up a large part of total
lending; however, many of the 2400 banks have a captive market in the enterprises by which they are
owned. In the Czech Republic, competitive forces in banking are quite strong, due both to the rapid
entry of new banks and the access of many companies to foreign loans. Such access also plays a role
in  Hungary. In particular joint ventures between domestic and  foreign companies have access to
foreign finance, and competition to  lend to  these enterprises is fierce among the smaller, private
banks. In contrast, the market for loans to large companies is dominated by a few banks and is much
less competitive, partly due to the fact that many of these companies need restructuring and lending to
them at present is not attractive. There is even less competition in Poland. New private banks have not
played a major role, and until recently entry by  foreign banks has remained limited. The market
remains dominated by the major state banks.
Despite heightened competition in these countries it would appear unwise, however, to rely
solely on competitive forces as a disciplinary mechanism to ensure that banks use their control powers
over enterprises in a profit-maximising way.
Table 6
Elements of the legal and regulatory environment
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Rules  for share  Ownership  of shares  is  Ownership  of shares  is  Ownership  of purchased
ownership  restricted  to a maximum  of  restricted  to a  total of  60%  shares  is  restricted  to 25%
10%  of  own  capital  and  25%  of  own  capital  and  that  of  of  bank  capital  but  the
of capital  and  reserves.  one  enterprise  (direct  and  President  of the  National
Limit  does  not apply  to  indirect)  to 15%  of  capital  Bank  of  Poland  can  raise  this
debt/equity  swaps,  where  for universal  banks  and  40%  limit  to 50%.
shareholdings  have  to be  for investment  banks.
reduced  to the  legal  limit  Limits  do not apply  to
within  2 years.  separately  recorded  and
handled  shareholdings
arising  from  debt/equity
swaps  for a  maximum
period  of 18  months.
Exposure  rules  As  proportion  of  capital:  As  a proportion  of capital:  As  proportion  of  capital:
individual  customers  max.  individual  customers  max.  individual  customers
25%;  entities  with  special  25%;  total  of large  loans  (including  guarantees)  max.
relationships  (e.g.  more  than  max.  600%.  Restrictions  on  1  5%  and  any  one  loan
10%  of shares  owned  by  insider  lending.  agreement  max.  10%.
bank):  max.  20%;  banks  in  President  of  the National
Czech/Slovak  Republic  or in  Bank  can  relax  these  rules
OECD  area:  80%;  ten  by  allowing  banks  to count
largest  debtors:  max.  230%.  long-term  loans  towards
To be  attained  by  end-  1995,  capital  and  can  increase  the
with transitional  provisions.  limit  to 50%.




In all countries,  a regulatory  framework  has been put in place that is modelled  closely on
rules in western countries.  For example,  a capital-to-asset  ratio of 8% or more is now required,  and
new accounting,  loan classification  schemes and mandatory  provisioning  have been introduced 33.
While  bank regulations  have  been tightened  and to a large degree  brought  into line with international
practice,  implementing  them has not been easy. This is partly due to the difficulties  of establishing
reporting  systems for banks and to the lack of experience  of the supervisory  agencies.  All countries
have  established  such agencies,  either  in the form of departments  of the central  bank (Czech  Republic,
Poland  and Russia)  or of a separate  government  body (Hungary).  Initially,  as was to be expected,  the
new supervisory  bodies experienced  difficulties,  partly because  of the inexperience  of staff and the
absence of established  procedures  for off-site and on-site inspection.  These difficulties  have been
recognised,  however,  and have begun to be addressed  in all countries,  often with the help of foreign
technical  assistance.
Despite substantial  progress,  two fundamental  problems remain. The first is that despite
some foreign assistance,  there is still an acute lack of human capital and developed information
systems that the supervisory  authorities  can draw on to perform  their function.  The second is the
credibility  of bank supervision.  If banks do not or cannot  comply  with the new regulations,  perhaps
because the gap between the initial situation and the newly required  standards  is too wide, bank
supervisors  may be faced with a difficult  choice between  regulatory  forbearance  and the closure  of
banks. Given the banks' initial situation, many of the new rules could not be complied with
immediately. To  some extent the countries in  question have attempted to  deal  with  these
circumstances  through  transitional  provisions  which phase in the new regulations  over time. In some
cases, however,  even  transitional  provisions  cannot  be complied  with.
Under these circumstances  it  is  difficult to  enforce high regulatory standards. Strict
application  of the law might  require  the closure  of a large  segment  of the banking  industry  or of major
banks.  Mergers  with other  banks  may  provide  a partial  solution  but can work  only if potential  partners
have  a strong  capital  base,  which  in most cases appears  unlikely.  The threat  to close  large  banks  is not
credible  because  of the large  costs  associated  with it. There  is an obvious  danger  of time inconsistency
here.  If the regulatory  rules are such that banks can comply  at reasonable  cost to themselves  and the
economy,  then the imposition  of such rules can be expected  to lead to changed  bank behaviour  and
efforts to comply. The Government  and the legislature  are then in a position to induce changed
behaviour  through better regulations  and tighter supervision. 34 This is not the case when banks can
argue  that compliance  with the regulations  would be prohibitively  costly or simply impossible.  The
Government  can then be expected  to show regulatory  forbearance  if many banks or a large bank do
not comply  with the rules, and the banks  know  this.
In practice  governments  have opted  for a mixed strategy  to overcome  the lack of credibility
of the new regulatory regimes.  To some extent they have showed regulatory leniency  and have
extended  the period for complying  with the new regulations.  At the same time, they have helped
banks meet the standards  in question  through  measures  to improve  banks' balance  sheets.  They have
also shown  a willingness  to merge  and even close  smaller  banks.
There is little doubt that supervision  has become  increasingly  tight. But it is also clear that
much  room  for improvement  is left,  and that bank supervision  is not yet very effective  in insuring  that
33  An overview  of bank  regulation and supervision  is  in Group of  Banking  Supervisors  from Central  and
Eastern European Countries (1992), Report on Banking Supervision in Central and Eastern European Countries, Basle.
See also Dittus (1994), section 3.
34  In game-theory parlance they are able to occupy a Stackelberg leadership position.
23regulations are respected. Currently, the supervisory capacity in all countries under review is not at the
level required to provide effective monitoring and supervision for banks.
The legal and regulatory framework
In central Europe and Russia the current legal and regulatory framework does not show
restrictions on bank involvement in corporate control to the extent found in the United States. Banks
are allowed  to  hold  shares in non-financial companies and  to  exercise  control rights.  However,
prudential regulations apply, which are more restrictive than for example those in Germany (table 6).
In the central European countries, ownership of shares is restricted to a certain percentage of own
capital (10% in the Czech Republic, 25% in Poland and 60% in Hungary). Only in cases where shares
are acquired through a debt for equity swap are these rules relaxed for a limited period of time in the
Czech Republic and Hungary (see table 6). It is probably not the case that current regulations are a
binding  constraint on  bank equity holdings  in nonfinancial firms at  present. 35 However, they  do
clearly limit a large scale expansion of such activity.
Bank incentives to make sound investments
This section examines the behaviour of banks with respect to their investment policies. First
it is argued that bank behaviour has changed substantially since the inception of reform, and that the
days of large-scale, indiscriminate lending to old customers are over. Secondly, we  analyse how
strong the current incentives are for banks to make sound investments. Thirdly, we look at banks'
strategy with respect to share ownership. This analysis is based to a large degree on interviews with
bank managers in Hungary and Poland, but ancillary information on intentions and behaviour in the
Czech Republic and Russia is used, too.
In the past, bank lending was entirely passive and basically the accounting reflection of the
plan. When a two-tier banking system was established, the new commercial banks maintained close
links with their former clients, partly out of inertia and partly because of the lock-in effect created by
large loans which many enterprise were no longer able to service. Initially, banks often rolled over
loans or capitalised interest in order to avoid revealing their own insolvency.
Table 7
Indicators of behavioural change
Net lending  to enterprises  (X of GDP)
Czech  Republic  6.4  2.9  5.5
Hungary  1.6  -2.5  1.6
Poland  8.0  1.1  3.3
Interest  rate  spread  (Q4)
Czech  Republic  5.9  6.7  7.2
Hungary  4  11.2  8.8
Poland  14.2  15.5  20.7
35  This is despite the fact that probably  the lion's  share of bank equity  holdings  in Poland  and Hungary  are in related
financial companies rather than nonfinancial firms.
24Since  1991, however, bank behaviour appears to have changed. An illustration of these
changes is provided in table 7. Net lending by banks to enterprises declined dramatically in this year
and even turned negative in Hungary. At the same time, the spread between lending and borrowing
rates widened. Tighter lending policies and the increased spread are probably best  understood  as
banks' reaction to the visible emergence of a large portfolio of bad loans, combined with a tightening
of accounting standards, bank regulation and supervision. While other interpretations of developments
in 1992 are also possible, the explanation that banks altered their behaviour as a reaction to changed
circumstances seems to be the most convincing one.36 The National Bank of Hungary has come to
this conclusion (Bod, 1993), as has Hrncir (1994) in the case of the Czech Republic. For Poland, the
OECD (1995) notes that automatic extension of credit to troubled firms - which dominated in 1990/91
- has clearly  come to an end.
It would be premature, however, to conclude from this evidence that the incentive problems
of banks have disappeared. A sound capital base is a necessary but not sufficient condition to ensure
that banks have incentives to make good investments. The expectations of bank managers are critical.
If they believe that poor performance will trigger a government bailout in the future with little or no
consequences for themselves for themselves, then their incentive to take difficult decisions on existing
borrowers and to  screen carefully potential borrowers are not strong. If they  cannot expect such
government support, then the incentive for good performance is much stronger.
For outsiders it is difficult to form a good understanding of the incentives banks are facing.
Personal relationships and tacit understandings between bankers and government agencies are factors
that are difficult to evaluate. Nonetheless, three indicators can be helpful in evaluating the chances of
future bailouts. The first one is the degree of government influence and control over banks. The more
control ihe government has, the higher is its responsibility for the banks' policies and the more it is
likely  to  support  banks  that  are  experiencing difficulties as  a  result  from  decisions  that  were
influenced, directly or indirectly, by the government. A second indication is provided by government
behaviour in the past. Governments that have bailed out banks in the past without implementing tough
measures are likely to be expected by bank managers to do so again in the future. A third indication
may be provided by the degree of industry concentration. Often governments have been seen to allow
smaller banks to fail, but to extend safety nets under the larger ones (too-big-to-fail).
On  all  three  counts  the Russian  banking  system appears to  be  the  least likely to  get
government support. Government influence in the new banks is almost non-existent. Banks have also
not been bailed out in the past as there was no need to do so. Both debts and assets in the Russian
economy were wiped out by  hyperinflation in the past few years. The share and influence of the
formerly large  and powerful  state banks  has dwindled  as a  consequence. Finally,  the  degree of
industry concentration is low. The failure of one of the larger private banks would hardly lead to
contagion effects and therefore the government could afford to let it fail.
In the Czech Republic majority stakes of all banks have been privatised 37; the remaining
share is held by the National Property Fund that provides an insulating layer between banks and the
government. State influence is minimal. Government behaviour suggests that the likelihood of future
bailouts is small. The recapitalisation of the banking system was done early and was clearly linked to
past loans. Banks that got into difficulties later were either closed or taken over by other institutions
and management paid for their mistakes by losing their positions. Since the inception of reforms, the
banking industry has become less concentrated with the largest bank holding less than a third of total
assets. Two or three banks may be (implicitly) covered by a too-big-to-fail insurance, but it is clear
that existing management would be fired should such intervention  be required.
36  The  evidence  is analysed  in detail  in Dittus  (1994,1995).
37  Except  for the Consolidation  bank (the "loan  hospital").
25Although three banks have been privatised in Poland, the major banks remain state-owned.
They are shielded to  some degree from government interference through independent supervisory
boards and  so  far  the  owner of  the  banks--the Ministry  of  Finance--has acted  to  protect bank
management from the requests of other ministries. The banks have been recapitalised in the context of
a tough restructuring programme, involving major behavioural and  organisation changes. Finally,
industry concentration is low. However, the regional specialisation means that the failure of one of the
major banks would probably be solved through mergers and take-over (as has already happened).
The threat of no  further bailouts is probably least credible in Hungary. The government
continues  to  own  the  major  banks  directly  and  has  in  the .past  exerted  its  influence  through
management reshuffles. Government support policies likewise suggest a certain likelihood of future
bailouts should difficulties arise. The government has injected new capital into the banks in several
rounds over the past few years, each one coming shortly after the previously one. Bank management
was not changed in any  of the rounds. The major banks remain too large  for the government to
consider letting them fail.
In sum, in all countries the incentives to make good investments has improved. Differences
between countries are pronounced, however. Powerful market incentives seem to be at work at the
private  larger banks  in  Russia 38 and  also  in  the  Czech  Republic.  Incentives for  making  good
investments are still strong in Poland. Market incentives are probably weakest in Hungary.
Banks' attitude to share ownership and corporate control
The purpose of this section is to understand how banks are using the leeway they have and
to what extent they are interested, from a purely commercial point of view, to acquire share holdings
and to exercise active shareholder control.
Although there is a wide variation of opinions, depending on the individual bank's history,
market position and ownership structure, three themes come out clearly from our interviews with bank
managers and officials.
i)  New, private banks, whether in central Europe or in Russia, do  not want to  own
companies and to play  a role in corporate governance through the ownership channel. Four main
reasons are given for this. First, private banks consider that an active shareholder role is extremely
costly  in  terms  of human  capital  and management time  while  the pay-off  is  low  compared to
concentrating on the core business of relationship banking. Several banks made it quite explicit that
with a staff of a few hundred people and the given skill profile they could not take an active role in
restructuring and supervising a company in more than a handful cases. Secondly, they want to avoid
the "moral obligation" to extend financing to a company they own in part and perceive a very strong
conflict of interest between ownership and independent credit appraisal. Most consider that a very
tight Chinese wall would be necessary, so tight indeed that the investment banking part might as well
be constituted as a separate legal unit. Thirdly, these banks do not see much synergy between the
lending business and corporate control through partial ownership. Several indeed were quite explicit
in that they consider commercial and investment banking to require completely different skills and
would not want to use their loan officers for restructuring activities. Fourthly, these dynamic new
banks  consider  that  their  lending  and  account  relationship  with  customers  give  them  enough
information and leverage over companies already. They do not feel that ownership would give them
much in addition.
38  To the degree that supervision  is weak and legal enforcement  lacking, these market incentives  may, of
course,  in some  cases very  well lead  to illegal  behaviour.
26The only exception these banks are willing to make - and this is equally true for the better
Russian banks - concern small  share holdings of up  to about 5%  in order to cement  a business
relationship with  a client enterprise, provided the enterprise is requesting the bank to take such a
stake. Indeed, in several cases have companies approached the banks and asked that they take up a
small stake.
In general the position of these banks can be summarised as a strong determination to focus
on the core business of relationship banking and not to be distracted by other activities.
ii)  The large, and partly state-owned, banks see a role for  themselves in restructuring
and corporate control to the degree that it is necessary to recover their loans, but only to this degree.
Both in Hungary and Poland, the recapitalisation programs force banks to take a more active role in
the restructuring of insolvent clients. Thus banks have little choice. It is interesting to note, however,
that even these banks do not usually actively seek taking equity stakes. First experiences with work-
out units  has  taught them  how  skill-intensive and  demanding an active role  is, and the  general
conclusion seems to be to avoid being dragged too deeply into active shareholder roles.
The behaviour of banks under the financial restructuring law in Poland provides perhaps the
best illustration of these points. This law obliges recapitalised  banks to come to agreements with their
defaulting debtors. They have three options: they can swap debt for equity, write down and reschedule
loans in a Chapter I I-type procedure which does not involve the courts, or sell non-performing loans
at a discount on the secondary market. Banks resorted to debt-for-equity swaps in about 30% of all
cases. 39
For  example,  the  Polish  Development Bank  engaged  in  two  swaps  and  has  equity
investments in about 15 other enterprises. Its work-out department which handles equity investments
has a staff of eight and often draws on foreign consultants to leverage its resources. Despite its limited
involvement and staff this bank is one of most active large banks with regard to equity investment and
restructuring activity. This only serves to highlight the general reluctance of banks to get involved in
actions that involve an active role in corporate control. Clearly, the financial restructuring law has
forced many banks to acquire expertise in this area and to build up expert staff, and may thus have
contributed to overcome the reluctance of commercial banks to shoulder the set-up costs for equity
ownership and the exercising of corresponding control rights.
Nonetheless, the  recently introduced strategy of the  Polish  Development Bank  towards
equity investments clearly indicates that the reluctance of entering this line of business remains high.
PDB intends to limit equity holding to less 20%; it prefers investments where a strong partner takes
care of corporate control, as it considers that its capacity for involvement in corporate governance and
restructuring is  limited to  at  most 3  to  4  firms 40;  there  should be  a  possibility  of  exiting  the
investment after 3 years, a requirement that highlights the importance of liquid securities markets;
and, finally, investments should in any case be exited after 5 years. Equity ownership and corporate
control on a larger scale, so the management feels, is a distinct business from commercial banking and
is best pursued in separate organisational units. Indeed, PDB is in the process of setting up  separate
investment funds and established a joint venture with Kleinwort Benson to manage one of the soon-
to-be established National Investment Funds. It is also worth noting that equity ownership of Polish
banks in general is already close to the legal limit, although most of this is in the form of equity stakes
in other financial institutions.
39  See Baer and Gray  (1994).
40  However,  their capacity  to search  for  attractive  investment  opportunities  is much  higher.
27There appear to be two major exceptions to the general rule of banks' reluctance to  own
equity. First, in some cases the bank realises that enterprise management is consciously driving down
the value of the firm in order to pick up the pieces at low prices. Then banks are sometimes prepared
to buy stakes in these companies in order to replace management. The second exception concerns
enterprises where banks perceive a clear under-exploited upside potential. In this case several of the
larger banks are prepared to buy minority stakes of up to 20%, provided there is another good and
active shareholder (e.g. a foreign investor) which can be assumed to provide effective governance.
iii)  Debt-for-equity  swaps  are  not  particularly  popular  with  banks.  In  Poland,  as
mentioned above, swaps have occurred in only about 30% of all cases. In Hungary, debt-equity swaps
appear even less popular. Debt-for-equity swaps are often avoided because of the implied loss of
collateral. Banks are reluctant to "swap bad debt for bad equity". This may be particularly the case in
Poland where bank loans--whether secured or not--are senior to all other types of loans. In addition, in
the case of unlisted companies, Polish prudential regulations require that a zero value is assigned to
such stakes in the balance sheet, forcing banks to fully provision against the swapped loan.
C.  Summary
This section has analysed the existing conditions in central Europe and Russia. A number of
conditions are of importance with regard to the issue of the most appropriate mechanism of corporate
governance. In brief, they are:
i)  Very  illiquid  corporate securities  markets, with  little prospect  that  will  develop
quickly.
ii)  Diverse restructuring requirements of enterprises, with  an emphasis  the  need  for
accounting, marketing and financial expertise.
iii)  In some countries, continued state influence over large parts of the system.
iv)  Relatively weak competitive forces in banking.
v)  The need for improved supervision of the banking system.
vi)  In some countries, continued expectations among bank managers the government will
subsidise losses from bad investments.
vii)  Lack of bank expertise in the restructuring of firms. In some such as Poland, banks
have been forced to attain such expertise.
IV.  Implications for the Role of Banks  in Ownership  and
Governance
The impracticality of relying on  liquid securities markets and  take-overs as a  means of
governance in eastern Europe and Russia leaves a primary role to some type of large shareholder
monitoring. The combination of severe information asymmetries  between insiders and outsiders, and a
lack of expertise in evaluating any information that is publicly available means that securities markets
in eastern Europe and Russia are likely to remain undeveloped for quite some period of time. This
essentially rules out any role for the U.S. model of corporate governance which relies to a substantial
extent on  anonymous securities markets and the threat of take-over as  a method  of management
discipline (Tirole  (1991) and  Phelps et  al  (1993) reach a  similar conclusion. However, note  that
Miszei (1994a) argues the opposite point). Indeed there may be some dangers in trying to create more
liquid securities markets while relying primarily on an active shareholder to monitor firms. First,  a
higher degree of liquidity may lessen the incentives of investors to monitor their investments rather
than sell them. Second, as the example of Japan illustrates, if banks are chosen to play a primary role
as active investors in firms, their ability to do so may be hampered if they cannot control firms' access
28to external finance. The question we address here is whether banks are the appropriate institutions for
this role.
A.  The Argument  against  Banks
Bank capacity to monitor: limited managerial capacity and competing bank
functions
Our snapshot of existing conditions in eastern Europe shows that banks suffer form a severe
lack of expertise and human capital in evaluating and monitoring firms. This would appear to provide
a clear prima facie case against a large bank role in restructuring and corporate governance. But this
lack of expertise characterises not just  banks, but all domestic institutions in  eastern Europe and
Russia. Thus any arguments against banks based solely on their limited capacity in this regard are not
particularly strong.
However, there are reasons to  suspect that state-owned banks might  have  less expertise
compared to other possible domestic candidates for the role of active investor. Much of the current
management and staff at the banks was hired and trained under the regime of central planning. The
emphasis then was on  book-keeping, not on  commercial banking and  certainly not on  the  skills
required to manage a portfolio of large equity stakes in firms. Thus management and staff are unlikely
to be able to develop quickly the entrepreneurial and business skills necessary to play a major role in
corporate governance. Indeed, some observers have gone so far as to talk about the "negative human
capital" embodied in the state-owned banks, suggesting that their break-up or scaling down would be
beneficial. In countries such as Poland and Hungary where the  state banks  still comprise the vast
majority of the banking sector, this may be a much more powerful argument against banks playing a
primary  role  in  corporate  control than  it  is  in  Russia  where  the  private  banks  are  far  more
predominant.
In addition, banks have other functions to perform that are just  as important if not more
important than  the corporate control function. In the transition economies, banks provide the only
payment services available; they are the almost exclusive providers of financial instruments; and they
are the predominant sources of external finance for enterprises. The financial services they provide
may be poor but currently they are the only game in town. Ensuring continued provision of these
services and  overall confidence in the  financial system is clearly essential. Banks are also  at  the
interface between the  central bank and  the  economy through their large  presence in  the  money
markets. Given the limited experience of bank management, it will almost certainly be stretching their
capacity to conduct normal commercial banking activities if the ownership and control of firms is an
additional responsibility for them. In other words, banks may simply not have the capacity to play an
important role in the ownership and control of firms given their limited ability even to conduct more
traditional commercial banking operations.41
Bank incentives to monitor: governance and supervision issues
Even if banks had the managerial capacity to be important players in the governance of
firms, their incentives may be such that they fall prey to conflicts of interest in  conducting their
activities. Bank credit to enterprises in central Europe (though not in Russia) is highly concentrated
among a few mostly state-owned banks that have yet to be fully weaned off of bail outs from the state,
and that are inadequately supervised. Such a situation would appear to be very susceptible to banks
abusing or misusing any powers of ownership and control over firms that they might have.
41  See Scott  (1992)  for  an argument  along these  lines.
29First, given that most large banks are still state-owned, they could be put under pressure by
the government to subsidise loans to firms whose bankruptcy would create political problems. This of
course is true whether or not the banks own and control firms. However, the situation is worsened if
banks do have this power, since large stakes held by banks might preclude the ownership by a non-
politicised agent that may have genuine interests to maximise the value of the firm.
Second, the relationship between banks and the govemment is further complicated by the
fact that in some countries the expectation persists that the govemment will bail out banks that get
into trouble in the future by making unsound loans. Giving banks an ownership role in enterprises
under conditions in which bank management is not held responsible for their investment decisions
would mean that firms are unlikely to be monitored efficiently.
Third, the current state of supervisory capacity in the transition countries means that even
without the perverse incentives introduced by state ownership and expectations of future bail outs,
there  is  little  safeguard  against  banks  making  unwise  or  imprudent  loans.  Giving  banks  the
opportunity  to  make  equity  investments which  by  their  very  nature  are  more  risky  than  debt
investments could be a recipe for disaster when bank supervision is very weak.
Finally, the concentrated nature of the banking system means that the discipline imposed by
market competition is weak in some market segments, notably the one of large loans to non-prime
borrowers. In addition, the opportunities for banks to extract rents from firms in which they have large
equity stakes is enhanced by a lack of competition.
In sum, even if banks had the ability to engage in a govemance role without impeding their
ability to conduct traditional commercial banking activities, several arguments suggest that they might
not use their control powers in a constructive manner. State ownership, the persistence of expectations
of future bail-outs, weak bank supervision and a lack of competition all mean that banks' incentives to
use corporate control powers to maximise firm value are not strong. At worst, the incentives created
by  these conditions might  lead not only to  a failure to restructure firms properly, but to  the re-
emergence of bad asset problems in the future.
Restructuring  requirements  offirms
The description of the restructuring needs of eastem Europe and Russia suggests that banks
may not be the most suitable institutions to play the primary role of active investor in the firm. First,
as part of their inherited relationships with the large industrial firms the banks may have established
links with current management or other stakeholders that make it harder for them to engage in radical
downsizing and  restructuring than other active investors with  no such links. 42 Second, banks are
unlikely to  be  able to  supply the  expertise in  financial management, accounting,  marketing and
inventory control that enterprises desperately need and that a  successful active investor would be
expected to provide. Once again, arguments against banks versus any other domestic active investor
based  solely on  the  ability to  supply such expertise are not strong  since there  is  no  competing
domestic candidate for an active investor role that has these skills in any abundance 43--what it does
point  to is the desirability (as far as is politically possible) of a large  foreign venture-capital-like
element in the corporate governance mechanism.
42  Shleifer  and Summers  (1988)  point out that long-term  relationships  between  financiers,  managers  and other
stakeholders  in the western  firm may be of considerable  valuable.  In the context of a firm in one of the transition
economies,  these long-term  relationships  may be a carry-over  from the days of central bank management  of the central
plan and thus be of considerable  negative  value  to the extent that they lead bankers  to continue  lending  money to their
friends  in the state firms  regardless  of the economic  prospects  of the firm.
43  Although,  as argued  earlier,  it may well be the case that the management  of the state banks have  substantially
less such expertise  than other  domestic  candidates.
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Banks' current involvement and the lack of other viable institutions
One argument  for giving  the current  state banks  a role in corporate  governance  stems from
two political realities.  The first is that it may not be politically  feasible to supplant  the state banks
with completely  new institutions,  as proposed  by a number  of western  economists.44  Given  that these
institutions  are going to continue to exist, and given that they have a very large presence in the
banking  and financial  sectors  of many transition  countries  (Russia  excepted),  they are likely to play
some role in the corporate  control  of large firms. The second  reality  is that the state banks in some
transition  countries  have  already  been  playing  an important  role in the restructuring  of large firms for
a number  of years. Primarily  motivated  by their need to do something  about the bad loans on their
books, some state banks have swapped  the debt for equity in a few of these firms and have made
attempts  at restructuring  them. 45 This has occurred  to differing  degrees in different countries and
probably  not to the extent anticipated  a few years ago, but nevertheless  it has occurred  and not
without some degree of success. Indeed, some state banks (for example, PDB in Poland) have
arguably  the greatest level of expertise  in the country  in the restructuring  of large enterprises.  Thus
any policy on the development  of a corporate  control mechanism  should recognise  the state banks'
current  and likely  continued  role in this area.
Related  to the above  point is the question  of who  could  be an active  investor  if it is not to be
the state banks? Private  and foreign  banks--who  might appear  to be the better agents  to accomplish
ownership  and governance  tasks because they are not burdened  by bad debts or have any state
involvement--do  not appear  to be doing so, but are content  with sticking  to basic  corporate  lending  to
the best credits. There are a limited  number  of other candidates  that could be viable and important
players in a governance  role in all but the long term. For example, pension funds or insurance
companies  are not large enough to be important  players in the financial  markets or in corporate
governance  for some  time to come.  The only serious  alternative  to banks,  in the medium  term at least,
appear  to be investment  funds.  A detailed  analysis  of investment  funds  in the Czech  Republic  can be
found in Shafik (1994), Coffee  (1994) and Claessens  (1994). How effective  these bank-managed
funds  will  be from  a corporate  governance  perspective  remains,  however,  to be seen. 46
44  See Phelps  et al (1993). Of course,  in Russia  this has been largely  achieved  as an unintended  side effect of
the hyperinflation.
45  The  relatively  small  number  of bankruptcies  in these  countries  (Hungary  excepted)  is not a good  indicator  of
bank's involvement  in corporate  restructuring. Bankruptcy  proceedings  in all countries  are very slow.  Banks have
attempted  to deal with defaults  by threatening  to shut down firm's  access  to trade finance  to force a restructuring.  And at
times  they have indeed  taken  equity  stakes  in companies  in default  to them  to exert  direct  influence  on management.
46  For the purposes  of this paper,  two features  stand out. First, the largest  bank-affiliated  funds created very
broad  portfolios,  comprising  between  200 and 500 companies.  Hence  they deliberately  refrained  from gaining effective
control in a smaller number  of companies.  This is in marked contrast  to some of the larger and successful private
investment  funds and the ones established  by foreign  banks  which deliberately  went for controlling  stakes in companies,
sometimes  in violation  of the (apparently  not too strongly  enforced)  rules. Why did domestic  banks forego  this unique
opportunity?  A number  of explanations  can be advanced,  ranging  from carelessness  to fear of not being able to invest all
voucher points. Perhaps  the most convincing  one is that bank-affiliated  funds tries to obtain small stakes in a large
number  of firms in the hopes of attracting  banking  business  through  those relationships.  Secondly,  banks apparently  do
not enforce  strict fire-walls  exist between  themselves  and their investment  funds. In some cases bank management  or
employees  have been  used to fill the supervisory  board  positions  the banks'  IPFs are entitled  to. In others  there is a regular
exchange  of information  between the bank and its IPF. The close co-operation  between banks and their IPFs has not
however led to improved corporate  govemance  as some had hoped. On the contrary,  providing effective corporate
governance  and being actively  involved  in restructuring  is seen by banks as high cost activities  with little return  - given
their generally  low stakes  in the companies.  Instead,  they are using  their information  actively  to trade securities.  These are
early days,  and any  judgement  must remain  tentative.  But it would  appear  as if bank involvement  in company  ownership
has done  more  to promote  the trading of securities  than to improve  corporate  govemance  directly.
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corporate governance and restructuring, at least through the IPF vehicle, it is noteworthy that other,
private investment companies have chosen the corporate governance road. And judging from first,
preliminary evidence, it seems is if concentrated ownership were indeed perceived by the market to be
sign of better prospects: large, strategic ownership by domestic or foreign investors has had a strongly
positive influence on share prices (Claessens, 1994). Investment funds based on the Czech model may
therefore be a viable alternative to banks as primary agent of corporate governance.
Banks'informational advantages
Banks may be best placed to mitigate the severe information problems between managers
and any potential owners. This still seems to apply in central Europe even though much of the banks'
involvement with borrowers was under a completely different regime. This comparative advantage in
gathering information about enterprises stems from their on-going relationship with the  firm as a
creditor and payment  settler. To the  degree that enterprises require new loans or the roll-over of
existing ones, banks can and do request privileged access to internal information about the firm. They
are also, in the case of large customers, likely to know the enterprise managers and their capacities
fairly well. Banks' monitoring capabilities are strengthened by the fact that they require enterprises to
hold their deposit accounts with the main lending bank. In Russia, regulations remain effective which
forbid enterprises to open more than one current account, giving banks a full view of the cash flow of
their customers.
C.  Are Banks Ready to Play a Major Role in Corporate Governance?
We have argued that for some time to come effective corporate governance in central Europe
and Russia will need to come from large active shareholders. Even if securities markets developed
rather rapidly it would take years before a reliance on them and the take-overs associated with them as
a means of governance could be envisaged. The question of whether banks, in their present condition,
are the right institutions to play this role, has been the focus of this paper. The strongest argument for
banks appears to be the lack of obvious alternatives and the (limited) experience they have gained
already over the last few years. These arguments however currently appear to be outweighed by the
potential disadvantages. The banking system has other tasks to fulfil that are clearly more along the
lines of traditional commercial banking and arguably more important than that of the governance of
firms. At present, many banks are struggling to master their more traditional businesses. In addition,
the environment for banks needs to be  improved substantially before a larger role in governance
becomes  a  recommended  option.  Incentive  problems  have  not  been  resolved  completely  and
supervision is still weak.
Some comparisons with the current situation in the transition countries and the situation in
Japan  in the  immediate post World War  II period may be  instructive. As pointed  out by  some
observers advocating the adoption of Japan-like bank-firm ties for the transition countries, in many
ways there are considerable similarities between the two situations (see Hoshi, Kashyap and Loveman
(1994)).  In 1946, Japan was  faced with  a  transition from extreme centralisation and govemment
intervention in  the  economy to  a  market  economy. Post-war Japan  too had  a  severely  limited
productive capacity, a very high rate of inflation and extremely close ties between large banks and
govemment  administrators. The banking  system  was highly concentrated and  burdened  with  an
immense amount of bad debts as a result of previous govemment directed and unmonitored lending.
Despite these  problems,  the  Japanese were able to  install  a  system  of corporate governance of
enterprises led by the banks that coincided with a rapid recovery from the immediate post-war chaos
and 40 years of subsequent rapid economic growth.
The conditions in Japan in  1946 mentioned above mirror those currently in the transition
countries.  However, there  are  two  crucial  differences between  the  current situation  among  the
32transition countries and the  Japanese situation  in  1946. The first is  that, although market based
lending had been suspended in Japan for a number of years prior to and during the war, there was an
inherited institutional and human capital base in the banking system embodying knowledge of how to
evaluate investments and the soundness of loans. In contrast, market based lending and the evaluation
of investment proposals in the transition countries has been suspended for over 40 years and there
currently is no inherited expertise whatsoever in these areas in their banking systems.
Perhaps more important, however, is the fact that the Japanese adopted a conscious policy of
restructuring and placing the banking system on a sound financial footing before the restructuring of
nonfinancial firms. Indeed, banks cleaned up their balance sheets relatively quickly in Japan, and by
early 1948 they could be considered to be relatively sound and largely free of perverse incentives (see
Hoshi (1994)). They had never of course been under the ownership of the state. That meant that the
banks were very well placed to take an active role in the restructuring of the industrial sector without
succumbing to the dangers involved in doing so while still burdened by substantial bad debts or being
subject to undue state influence. In contrast, although the importance of putting the financial sector on
a sound footing was recognised early on in central Europe, it has taken a long time to make substantial
progress in this area. Although much has been achieved in the last few years, much also remains to be
done.
Indeed, perhaps a more relevant comparison to make is with the sad experiences in a number
of countries with emerging financial markets--such as Argentina, Chile, Venezuela and Mexico. 4 7 In
these countries the existence of close bank-enterprise relationships (often including the holding of
equity stakes in enterprises by banks) led to well-publicised asset problems and even bank failures. 48
A major reason for these problems was a legal and supervisory structure in these countries that was
unable  to  enforce  "good"  behaviour  on  the  banking  system.  This  may  be  the  more  relevant
comparison because it is quite clear that the legal and supervisory structure in the transition countries
is much closer to that in countries such as Argentina and Chile than it is to the current situation in
Japan or Germany, or arguably even to the situation in Japan in 1946.
D.  Implications  for regulation
Our analysis suggests that, for the time being, banks should not be allowed to take large
equity stakes and play a primary role in non-financial companies. The main reasons are that banks are
still subject to perverse incentives arising from weak competition and supervision, and the weak
credibility of government pledges that no further bank bailouts are in the offing. In addition, most
banks currently appear not to have the managerial capacity or the requisite business skills to take on
the governance role that many firms in the transition countries require. That is not to say that once
banks are free from their current problems a system of corporate governance  based primarily on banks
might not be appropriate in the medium term, particularly since well-developed and  liquid capital
markets are unlikely to play a major governance role in these countries for the foreseeable future.
However, if banks are to play such a role in the medium term, they would benefit from being given
opportunities to experiment in a limited manner with equity participations and governance roles now
in order to build up the experience necessary to play a more important role in the future.
Thus, while banks should be prevented from becoming large shareholders in firms, there is a
case for adopting a more lenient stance towards their equity participations and governance role in
47  We refer here to the banking system problems in Chile and Argentina in the early 1980's and in Venezuela in
the last year. The problems in Mexico over the last year have been much less extensive than in the previously mentioned
countries,  being largely confined to one or two banks that have made large insider loans to affiliated companies.
48  In some cases, the nature of the bank-enterprise relationship was enterprises taking large equity stakes in
banks, which in turn made large loans to the enterprise or enterprise affiliates.
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experience in owning firms, but also it is in those firmns  which are currently in default to the bank that
the bank  is likely to have some substantial informational advantages over other potential primary
shareholders. Such opportunities should be strictly controlled however, both in terms  of the length of
time the banks is allowed to own equity obtained through a swap of debt, and also, perhaps, related to
the perceived strength of the bank itself.
The implications for regulation are the  following: first banks should be restricted  in the
amount  of  equity  they  own.  The  current prudential  limits  in  central  European countries  seem
appropriate. But, secondly, banks should be given limited opportunities to swap bad debt into equity
and become active in governance. The current waiver period in the Czech Republic and Hungary of 18
to  24  months  for equity acquired through swaps of debt  again appears to accord well  with  this
principle. In addition, there may be a case for enabling the authorities to bar extremely weak banks
from making use of this waiver.
V.  Conclusion
Our review of corporate governance arrangements in the west suggests that for a  system
based on bank ownership and control of firms to be successful the banking system must be free of
perverse  incentives  and  state  interference and  subject to  adequate  supervision  by  the  banking
authorities  and  competition  from  market  forces.  Admirable  progress  over  the  past  few  years
notwithstanding, these conditions do not currently exist in the countries of central Europe and Russia
at present. Therefore, a corporate governance system based on bank ownership is not appropriate. That
is not to say that such a system would not eventually be appropriate for these countries. But before
that much more effort is needed to create a competitive, private and well-supervised banking system.
It  may  be  worth  pointing  out that this  effort  is needed in  any case,  regardless of any  possible
involvement of banks in corporate  governance.
The changes in the banking system that are a necessary precursor to any large scale bank
involvement in the ownership and governance of firms are simple to enunciate but much less easy to
implement. First, existing relationships between the state and banks must severed. Privatisation is the
strongest guarantee that bank investment decisions will not be subject to state influence. However,
bank privatisation in most countries has been slow. This reflects to some degree the difficulties, in the
early years of reform, to fully understand the poor condition of the financial sector. It also reflects the
many institutional and political obstacles to bank reform. In addition, the initial decision in some
countries to focus first on the "real economy" may have played a role. With the benefit of hindsight,
that decision now appears somewhat unfortunate, though understandable in the circumstances of the
early reform years.
Another important step is the dispelling of the belief - that still exists in some countries -
that  poor lending  and investments will eventually be underwritten by  the government with  little
consequences for  managers.  Here some countries have clearly  made  more  progress than  others.
Political factors have weighed heavily in some cases. But this issue must be resolved before banks can
be entrusted to make investment decisions and even traditional loans on a rational basis.
Strong competitive  forces  in  the banking  system are  another  necessary condition.  The
foundation of new private banks and the entry of foreign banks should therefore be encouraged. Some
countries, such as Poland, have been taking exactly the opposite tack here in refusing to issue new
licenses.
Effective bank supervision is essential for the soundness of the banking system in general
and in particular for the success of any corporate governance system based on bank ownership and
control. An effective prudential and regulatory framework requires a substantial investment in setting
34up institutions, accounting systems and information networks, hiring and training qualified personnel,
and ensuring the system is immune from political intervention. Given the size of this task this will
inevitably be  a drawn-out process. However, if  the establishment of a privatised and competitive
banking system is viewed as critical to  the development of a  successful financial system and  a
successful corporate governance system, then priority must be given to establishing a sound prudential
and regulatory framework. Foreign assistance will be crucial to the development of such a system.
While a governance system based on bank ownership and control of firms is not yet feasible,
there is a good case to be made for allowing banks to gradually gain experience through limited equity
ownership, in particular in the case of swaps of bad debt for equity. The regulations currently in place
seem conducive to such experimentation  while sufficiently tight to prevent the emergence of conflicts
of interest on a large scale.
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